The need for a more rounded account of behavioural science
Michael Hall of BIT takes task with Chater and Lowenstein’s representation of behavioural science practice: but we argue there is still a case to answer
The debate about ‘what behavioural science is and does’ continues with a response by Michael Hallsworth of BIT to the paper by Nick Chater and George Lowenstein. The paper argued that behavioural science placed too much emphasis on changing individual behaviours (with "disappointingly modest" results – which seems an understatement given recent findings) and not placed enough focus on behaviour change through systemic measures such as regulation and taxation. They characterise these, respectively, as the ‘i-Frame,’ (interventions aimed at the individual’s behaviour), and the ‘s-Frame’ (systemic interventions like rules, laws and taxes).
At the time we made a number of points:
what took so long to come to this conclusion? After all, those that are used to behaviour change systems such as COM-B , have long understood the need to focus on both individual and wider environmental factors.
we considered their view on the ‘s-Frame’ as limited, as this should not only include ‘Physical’ concerns (e.g. regulatory, taxation, distribution) but also Social and Cultural considerations.
the framing of ‘i-Frame’ and ‘s-Frame’ suggested a binary distinction but that we can find ways to influence the ‘s-Frame’ by working on changes in the ‘i-frame’ which have wider spill-over and catalyst effects in the wider population
RCTs tend to work well for ‘i-Frame’ style problems, (as Chater and Lowenstein indeed point out) which then limits the activities of behavioural science evaluation activity (and effectively shapes what is chosen for testing in the first place)
Michael Hallsworth offers a robust and detailed analysis of the paper which he finds to be “deeply flawed and ultimately self defeating” for a number of empirical, theoretical and pragmatic reasons. The analysis of the paper’s shortcomings are, as one would expect, well considered. So why do we at Frontline Be Sci continue to consider Chater and Lowenstein remains a step forward for the industry?
The answer is quite simple: while everything that Michael Hallsworth points out seems fair, what is not tackled directly is the way in which the industry has nevertheless promoted a sentiment of the power of individual level nudges.
A case in point is something of a side note in the paper but perhaps is a good illustration: Chater and Lowenstein cite the subtitle of the book published by the Chief Executive of BIT - ‘small changes can make a big difference’ - as evidence for an over-reliance on ‘i-frame’ solutions. Hallsworth suggests that if Chater and Lowenstein went beyond the front cover then they would have found several arguments for ‘s-frame’ behavioural science thinking.
Whilst it may well be true, this example perhaps illustrates the problem, and with this, why Chater and Lowenstein’s paper is welcome. Work ‘on the ground’ by behavioural scientists has long offered a more rounded approach to the discipline than is suggested by that subtitle. Most people working in the field do indeed draw on ‘s-Frame’ thinking and solutions (alongside the ‘i-Frame.)
But despite this, the sentiment that is often promoted is the ‘i-Frame’. Take a recent FT article extolling the benefit of (i-Frame) ‘nudging’ as ‘simple, cheap, and effective’ versus conventional government interventions (typically S-frame), which are characterised as involving spending a lot of money on relatively unproven or ineffective programmes.
Whilst the difference between the marketing and practice may be the equivalent of practitioners ‘campaigning in poetry but governing in prose,’ it is also perhaps understandable why people that are less involved in day-to-day behavioural science practitioner work may misunderstand the way the profession actually operates. And how the profession is presented to a wider audience does matter: it influences the work that gets chosen for conference presentations and publications in the media, it shapes how buyers of behavioural science write their briefs, and sets the expectations of stakeholders concerning what it will deliver.
It is for this reason that at Frontline Be Sci we continue to welcome the Chater and Lowenstein paper. While the flaws highlighted in the paper seem fair, it is still surely a timely challenge to the profession that talk about the work we do in a more rounded way. And if, as Michael Hallsworth suggests, two eminent heavyweights misunderstand what we do, then the need to talk about our practice in a rounded way is surely more urgent than ever.